THE IMPRINT OF KOSOVO ON THE LAW OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Julie Menus*
For nearly ten years, human rights advocates have tried to focus public
attention on Kosovo. They issued report after report of gross and systemic
human rights abuses in the troubled region.' International policy makers' had
overwhelming evidence that the pressure in Kosovo was mounting and that an
even greater human rights disaster loomed near,2 yet, they treated the warnings
as that of the boy who cried "wolf' too many times without a wolf being
present. Without the "wolf' of all-out war, international leaders failed to treat
Kosovo seriously.
Flash ahead to March 23, 1999: NATO war planes commence military air
operations and missile strikes in Yugoslavia. Suddenly, Kosovo becomes a lead
story in every media outlet.3 Kosovo finally comes into focus, but the optic is
blurred. In a rush to "do the right thing" or just "do anything," many human
rights advocates,' like the diplomats they criticize, start to get sloppy. They
accept a false slate of diametrically, opposed choices - intervention or no
intervention; protection of Serbian sovereignty or denial of Serbian
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See, e.g., Mertus & Mihelic, Open Wounds: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo, HELSiNKI
WATCH, (1994); Systematic Rights Abuses Reported in Kosovo, NEw EUROPE ON-LINE, Aug. 28, 1998, at
WL 24015766, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: HumanitarianLaw Violations in Kosovo, 10 Human Rights
Watch Report 9(D) (1998) .(visited Feb. 4, 2000)<http://www.hrw.org/reports98/kosovo/>.
2.
See Peter Humphrey, Albanians Victims Of Serbian Police,NEWSDAY, June 1, 1993, at WL
11375416; U.S. Dept. of State, SERBIA-MONTENEGRO HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES for 1995, March 1996
(visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http:llwww.usis.usemb.se/humanlhuman95/serbiamo.htm>; U.S. Dept. of State,
Serbia-Montenegro Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996, January 30, 1997 (visited Feb. 18,
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WL-WSJE.
3.
See, e.g., Norman Harper, Live a Moment of History, ABERDEEN PRESS AND JOURNAL May 6,
1999, at 16; U.S. Newspapers Roll Victory Drums in Kosovo Crisis, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 4, 1999;
Stephen Castle, European Elections: Swing To Apathy In Every Part Of Europe, THE INDEPENDENT
(LONDON) NEWS, June 14, 1999, at 9; R.C. Longworth, Bridge To BrighterFutureMust Span Ancient Hate,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE NEWS ZONE: C, May 30, 1999, at 1.
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sovereignty - without questioning what each choice actually means under
international law.
Czech President Vaclav Havel, among many others, claims that the NATO
alliance "acted out of respect for human rights" and that the war was probably
the first one that had been waged "in the name of principle and values." 4 If
only this were true, the legitimacy of actions in Kosovo would be much clearer.
But NATO did not act only in the name of human rights. Instead, leaders of
NATO countries offered-a cafeteria of justifications for their actions. The
Clinton Administration considered but refused to base its actions in Kosovo
solely on humanitarian rights grounds.5 Instead, the Administration offered an
array ofjustifications. Humanitarian concerns were rolled together with other
factors: the need for regional stabilization, the stemming of refugee flows, and
the need to protect NATO's reputation.6
Dr. Javier Solona, Secretary General of NATO, also bundled together
humanitarian and non-humanitarian concerns. At one point, he said that
NATO's "objective is to prevent more human suffering and more repression
and violence against the civilian population of Kosovo."7 In another breath, he
characterized NATO's efforts as "support[ing] international efforts to secure
Yugoslav agreement with an interim political settlement." 8 In other words bombing to get a deal. This latter justification - use of force to coerce a
political leader to sign an agreement - was clearly extra-legal. Under the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "[a] treaty is void if its conclusion
has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations." 9 Legal
justifications for the use of force in Kosovo should have been offered apart
from the mere desire to force a political leader to sign a "take it or leave it"
agreement.'°
4.
Vaclav Havel, "Kosovo and the End of the Nation-State," The New York Review of Books, June
10, 1999, at 6.
5.
The author spoke with members of Clinton's staff who said that they considered and rejected
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as the sole grounds for intervention in Kosovo. Instead, they
deliberately decided to come up with a laundry list of factors supporting intervention. Washington D.C. (June
1999).
6.
Bill Clinton, Address to the Nation on NATO Airstrikes (March 24, 1999), inSECURITY ISSUES
DIGEST March 25, 1999 (visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http://usa.grmbl.com/sl9990325h.html>). See also Jim
Garamone and Linda D. Kozaryn, NATO Attacks Serbs to Stop Kosovo Killings, U.S. Dept. of Defense,
DefenseLink, March 24, 1999 (visited Feb. 4, 2000) <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Mar1999/n03241999_9903245.html> (quoting White House spokesman Joe Lochart).
7.
Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, Press statement (March 23, 1999) (visited Feb.
5, 2000) <http://www.nato.intldoculpr/1999/p99-040e.htm>.
8.
Id.
9.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969 Vienna Article 52, Entry Into Force:
27 January 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf 39/28, U.K.T.S. 58 (1980), 8 I.L.M. 679.
10.
Serbia did offer a counterproposal. While the proposal would have rejected the presence of

20001

Mertus

By failing to specify clearly the legal parameters of their actions, NATO
allies opened themselves up to the criticism that they were not operating under
any legal grounds at all." At the same time, by failing to provide clear legal
justifications for intervention on human rights grounds, human rights advocates
opened themselves up to criticism that they were outside the law.
Human rights advocates bought into the notion that the legal debate over
humanitarian intervention consists of a tension between two competing
principles: respect for the "territorial integrity" and "political independence"
of states and the guarantees of "human rights" and "self-determination.' 2 This
framing of the issue hides the real questions at hand. The principles of
"territorial integrity" and "human rights" need not conflict. On the contrary,
they complement one another. In sum, territorial integrity cannot be had
without human rights and the realization that human rights can support the
integrity of a territory."
Today, I will explain why "territorial sovereignty" should not be the focus
when it comes to cases like Kosovo. Instead, more attention should be paid to
the parameters set for the "use of force" by international law. In my brief
remarks, I will outline the legal analysis of NATO actions under two sets of
basic international law documents: the United Nations Charter and the Geneva
Conventions. In doing so, I will examine two questions: 1) whether
international law supports the decision to use force in Kosovo; and 2) whether
international law supports the means chosen for the use of force in Kosovo.
The short answer is yes and no.
At face value, the words of the United Nations Charter appear to favor
anti-interventionists who are rightly concerned that intervention is susceptible
to misuse."' Anti-interventionists point to the first part of Article 2(4) of the
NATO troops in Kosovo, it would have permitted the presence of other (unarmed) internationals. For the text
of the proposal, (visited Feb. 5, 2000) <http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm>.
11.
See, e.g., Raju G.C. Thomas, NATO and InternationalLaw, available on the Web at (visited
Feb. 5, 2000) <http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/thomas.htm>.
See, e.g., Paul Szasz, "The Irresistible Force of Self-Determination meets the Impregnable
12.
Fortress of Territorial Integrity: A cautionary fairy tale about the clash in Kosovo and elsewhere," Address
at the University of Georgia School of Law, Georgia Society of International and Comparative Law, Banquet
(April 8, 1999) (Speech on file with author).
13.
The main opponent to this view, Louis Henkin, counters: "[c]learly it was the original intent
of the Charter to forbid the use of force even to promote human rights ... Human rights are indeed violated
in every country... But the use of force remains itself a most serious- the most serious- violation of human
rights." Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and US. Policy, in RIGHT v. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE 61 (1989).
14.
Domingo E. Acevedo, panelist at the American Society of International Law Proceedings,
Collective Self-Defense and the Use of Regional or SubregionalAuthority as Justificationfor the Use of
ForceAddress at the American Society of International Law Proceedings (April 12, 1984) in 78 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 1984, at 68, 73 (on the possible misuse of intervention); But see Barry M. Benjamin, Note,
UnilateralHumanitarianIntervention: Legalizing the Use of ForceTo Prevent Human Rights Atrocities,
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Charter, which declares that states "shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state. ..
They also rely heavily on Article 2(7), which
states that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state.. ." The general prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) is
6
supported by language in subsequent General Assembly resolutions.'
Only three explicit Charter exceptions exist to the general prohibition on
the use of force. None of these appear to apply to Kosovo. First, states may act
in self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. Even a broad reading of selfdefense is not particularly instructive with respect to Kosovo. The concept of
self-defense applies only to states; it does not protect individuals against their

16 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 120, 147-48 (1992/1993) (stating that "[any individual state action which is
permitted, such as self-defense, may result in potential abuse, but this potential abuse applies to almost every
legal rule. Obviously, not all states that invoke the doctrine of self-defense, a legal right, to justify their use
of force, do so truthfully. The benefits of self-defense, however, legitimize the doctrine despite the potential
abuse of its invocation. The same should be said for humanitarian intervention."). Id.; See also MYRES
McDoUGAL & FLORENTINo FEuciNO, LAw AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBuC ORDER 416 (1961); Oscar
Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620 (1984).

15. This provision is self-executing because it does not require a state to do anything; it simply
prohibits the commission of certain acts.
16. The 1966 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States
and Their Independent and Sovereignty provides that:
No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for whatever reason whatever,
in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention
and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the
State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements are condemned ...
[The
practice of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter of the
United Nations but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international
peace and security.
G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966). This resolution was
affirmed by the General Assembly in the 1970 adoption of the Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121 (Annex), U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
See A. Tanca, The Prohibitionof Forcein the U. N. Declarationon Friendly Relations of 1970, in TIHE
CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 307 (A. Cassese, ed., 1986).The International Court

of Justice has not issued a definitive ruling on the merits on humanitarian intervention in "Kosovo-like
situations." Its decisions narrowly construe the right of states to use force on human rights grounds. See
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)('The Court concludes that the
argument derived from the preservation of human rights in Nicaragua cannot afford a legal justification for
the conduct of the United States, and cannot in any event be reconciled with the legal strategy of the
respondent State, which is based on the right of collective self-defense."). Id. 249. See N. Rodley, Human
Rights and HumanitarianIntervention: The Case Law of the World Court, 38 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 321
(1989).

2000]

M ertus

own states." The self-proclaimed Albanian Kosova has never been recognized
as a state and the NATO countries undertaking the intervention were never
attacked or threatened with attack. Thus, the self-defense exception would
require an extremely expansive interpretation in order to apply to Kosovo.
A second exception to the general ban on the use of force is Security
Council enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the Charter. 8 Security
Council enforcement actions are limited by the requirement that that the
Security Council Act. The United Nations Security Council did adopt three
main resolutions concerning Kosovo prior to the NATO bombing. First, in
March 1998, the Council issued Resolution 1160, which imposed an arms
embargo on both parties and called upon the FRY and the leadership of Kosovo
Albanians to enter into meaningful dialogue for a peaceful settlement of
internal strife.' 9 In September 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution
1199, 2 which found the existence of "a threat to the peace and security in the
region" and enjoined the FRY to certain actions, including "ceas[ing] all action
by the security forces affecting the civilian population and order the withdrawal
of security units used for civilian repression."2 The Security Council warned
that "should the concrete measures demanded in this resolution not be taken, [it
would] consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore
peace and stability in the region."22 In the third main Security Council
Resolution, Resolution 1203, adopted on October 24, 1998, the Council
endorsed the OSCE and NATO agreements with FRY, and demanded once
more that FRY comply with the conditions set forth in Resolution 1199.23 It
would be a strain to contend that under any Security Council resolution the use
of force was authorized or approved. On the contrary, as it was clear that China
and Russia would veto the use of force, the Security Council failed to include
17.

SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANrrARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING

WORLD ORDER 139 (1996).
18.
See U.N. CHARTER, Article 2,17 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
..but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement mechanisms under Chapter VII.").
19.
SC Res. 1160, adopted by the Security Council at its 3868th meeting, March, 31 1998 (visited
Feb. 5, 2000) <http://www.nato.int/kosovoldocu/u98033 Ia.htm>.
20.
SC Res. 1199, adopted by the Security Council at its 3930th meeting September 23, 1998
(visited Feb. 6, 2000) <http://www.nato.inttkosovo/docu/u980923a.htm>.
21.
Id. I 4(a).
22.
Id. 16.
23.
SC Res. 1203, adopted by the Security Council at its 3937th meeting, October 24,1998 (visited
Feb. 6, 2000) <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u981024a.htm>.
24.
Bruno Simma, NATO, the U.N. and the Use of Force: LegalAspects, 1O EJlL 1 (1999) (visited
Feb. 6, 2000) reprinted at <http://www.ejil.org/joumallVoll/Nol/abl.htnl>. As Paul Szasz has pointed
out, the fact that the Security Council failed to act here cannot be interpreted as a rejection of any particular
course of action. "In a sense, by failing to act it rejected all alternative courses of action, including full
support for Milosevic." Paul Szasz, letter to Julie Mertus, dated July 25, 1999 (on file with author).
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use of force language - authorization of the use
in these resolutions the magic
2' 5
of "all necessary means.
After the NATO bombing commenced, the Security Council had at least
two opportunities to approve of the NATO intervention ex post. At the height
of the NATO bombing, on May 14, 1999, it issued Resolution 1239.26 This
resolution neither supported nor condemned the NATO bombing. The
resolution merely "not[ed] with interest the intention of the Secretary-General
to send a humanitarian needs assessment mission to Kosovo and other parts of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" and "[r]eaffirm[ed] the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of all states in the region."27 At the conclusion of the NATO
campaign, the Council issued Resolution 1244.28 While this resolution
"decid[ed] on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of
international civil and security presence, with appropriate equipment and
personnel as required,"2 9 it was wholly prospective in nature. The resolution
declined to comment on previous international intervention in Kosovo. These
and other Council statements fall short of offering ex post approval of the
NATO bombing and, thus, the Chapter VII exception to the use of force cannot
be said to apply to Kosovo.
The third explicit exception to the general prohibition on the use of force,
found in Chapter VIII of the Charter, permits actions undertaken by "regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance
of international peace and security."3 Regional arrangements may undertake
any action in this regard that is "consistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."'" Even if NATO is seen as a regional arrangement under Chapter
Council authorization, none of
VIII, regional actions also require Security
32
Kosovo.
to
respect
with
granted
was
which

Cf SC Res. 678 (1990)(SC resolution re. Kuwait), adopted by the Security Council at its 2963rd
25.
meeting, on November 29, 1990 (visited Feb. 6, 2000) reprinted at <gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/
undocslscd/scouncil/s90/32> and SC Res. 794 (1992) (SC resolution re. Somalia), adopted by the Security
Council at its 3145th meeting, on December 3, 1992 (visited Feb. 6, 2000) reprinted at
<gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/undocslscd/scounciVs92/69>. The language of the Kosovo declarations
implied only that the Security Council might authorize that "all necessary means" be taken in Kosovo at some
stage in the future.
26.
SC Res. 1239 adopted by the Security Council at its 4003rd meeting, May 14, 1999 (visited
Feb. 6, 2000) reprinted at <http://www.nato.int/kosovoldocu/u990514a.htm>.
Id.
27.
28.
SC Res. 1244, adopted by the Security Council at its 4011 th meeting, June 10, 1999 (visited
Feb. 6, 2000) reprinted at <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm>.
Id.15.
29.
30.
U.N. CHARTER, Article 52,1 1.
31.
Id.
32.
U.N. CHARTER, Article 53,1 1.
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Thus, the explicit exceptions in the United Nations Charter do not apply
to Kosovo. Is this the end of the story? No. Other provisions of the United
Nations Charter implicitly permit the use of force under certain limited
circumstances. This implicit grant of authority can be said to apply to Kosovo.
By its very terms the Charter does not prohibit all threats or uses of force.
Article 2(4) prohibits force against the "territorial integrity or political
independence of any state. .." We need to look closely at these words. As
interpreted in treaties and diplomatic history, "territorial integrity" refers not
to the "territory of a state" but to the "integrity of the territory. 33 An essential
condition of this integrity is the maintenance of certain standards of
administration on the territory, including the protection of fundamental human
rights norms. Forfeiture of that duty of maintenance opens the door for
intervention.3 4 Humanitarian intervention in such a case falls below the
threshold set in Article 2(4) since the intervenors do not seek to deprive the
state of its integrity but, rather, to enhance it. 3' Alternatively, intervention in
such cases could be justified on a "waiver" theory. Under this theory,
governments that commit violations of human rights forfeit any claims against
36
intervention by others for the protections normally offered by sovereignty.
These arguments are in line with modem conceptions of sovereignty. The
doctrine of human rights restricts the ability of states to do what it will with
their own citizens. Also, sovereignty refers not only to state borders, but also
to political sovereignty, that is, the ability of people within those borders to
effect choices regarding how they should be governed and by whom. 37 Those
who threaten that ability (be they internal or external in origin) violate the
33.

See ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECTS 56-72 (rev. ed.

1995).

34.
A somewhat more extreme view is that governments who abuse the human rights of their
citizens are in fact criminal in nature. Just as criminals lose their right to participate in the self-determination
of their state, so does a government. Consequently, if a government can be viewed as criminal, it then
becomes permissible for other states to take on the role of "policemen" and act to end the violations of human
rights. Michael J. Smith, Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues, in ETHICS AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 271-295, 286 (Joel H. Rosethal, ed. 2nd. ed. 1999), drawing heavily upon
MICHAEL WALTZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (New York, 1977).

35.
MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 19, at 71 (paraphrasing but not agreeing
with the argument of W. Michael Reisman in Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 177 (R. iUllich, ed., 1973)). Contra IAN
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 265 (1963) (arguing from a review of
travauxpreparatories for the United Nations Charter that the phrase "territorial integrity" was added to the
Charter A COMMENTARY 117 (B. Simma, ed., 1994).
36.

See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REvISION 844 (1971); See also Mitchell A. Meyers,

A Defense of Unilateral orMulti-Lateral Intervention Where a Violation ofInternational Human Rights Law
by a State Constitutes an Implied Waiver of Sovereignty, 3 IlSA J. INT'L & COMP. L 895 (1997).
37.
Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM.
J. INT'L L. 866, 872 (1990).
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sovereignty of the people.38 Accordingly, when another state intervenes to
protect human rights in such circumstances, it is not violating a principle of
sovereignty, but instead bolstering it.39
A more complete reading of the United Nations Charter further supports
the use of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo-like situations. Here, I will
suggest four points. First, the United Nations Charter advances central
principles that could not be protected in Kosovo without intervention. The
most central purpose of the organization is the maintenance of international
peace and security.' International peace and security means more than the
absence of war, there is a human rights element that must be remembered.
Human rights violations short of all-out war also constitute major breaches of
peace and security.4 In situations such as Kosovo, peace and security cannot
be said to exist so long as the state is free to commit gross and systemic human
rights abuses against its own people.
Second, Article 1 of the United Nations Charter includes, as a central
purpose, development of "respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples..." 2 Also included as a central purpose is "encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.. ."4 Self-determination does
not mean the ability of all groups of people to make their own state, but rather
the ability to participate in one's government and enjoy basic human rights."

See CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 229 (1993).
38.
39.
Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights, supra note 39, at 872.
U.N. CHARTER, Article 1,1 1.
40.
The United Nations Security Council has recognized that "non-military sources of instability
41.
in the economic, social, humanitarian, and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security." See
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3046th mtg. at 143, U.N. Doc. SIPV.3046 (1992).
U.N. CHARTER, Art. 1, 2.
42.
43.
U.N. CHARTER, Art. 1, 13. See also U.N. CHARTER Art. 55.
44.
Article 1(2) states that the basic purpose of the United Nations is to "develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples... "
Article 55 ties the principle of self-determination to respect for human rights. See supra note 44-45. The
principles of self-determination are also found in the International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1967) ("All peoples
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue economic, social, and cultural development." Id at Article 1); the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) (same wording); the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) ("All peoples have the right freely to
determine, without external interference, their political status and pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development, and every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter."). For an exhaustive collection of documents related to self-determination see DOCUMENTS ON
AUTONOMY AND MINORITY RiGrrs (Hurst Hannum ed., 1993).
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The prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) does not rule out the use of
force designed to the central goals of the United Nations. Where, as in Kosovo,
a government flouts respect for the principles of equal rights and selfdetermination and violates the most basic human rights and fundamental
freedoms of individuals, the use of force may be the only way to see the goals
of the United Nations upheld.
Third, humanitarian intervention may be required or permitted under the
human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter.45 Specifically, Articles
55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter implore "all Members [to] pledge
themselves to take joint action in cooperation with the Organization for the
achievement of... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all. . . ." The international community has an
interest in the protection of human rights of all people, regardless of state
borders.47 Where, as in Kosovo, a state is incapable of protecting human rights
or is itself the perpetrator, the use of force on human rights grounds, that is,
humanitarian intervention, may be the only solution. The grounds for
intervention are particularly strong where the case at hand concerns allegations

45.
Commentators supporting this view include: FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANrTARIAN
INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 173-74 (2d ed., 1997); Michael J. Bazyler,
Reexamining the Doctrine of HumanitarianIntervention in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and
Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547 (1987); ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: -PROCESS AND
PROSPECT, supra note 35, at 226; Michael J. Levitin, The Law of Forceand the Forceof Law: Grenada,
the Falkiands and Humanitarian Intervention, 27 HAirV. INT'L L J. 621 (1986); Richard Lillich,
HumanitrarianIntervention:A Reply to Ian Brownlie andaPlea for ConstructiveAlternatives, in LAW AND
CIVIL WAR INTHE MODERN WORLD 231-32 (J.N. Moore ed., 1974); Richard Lillich, Intervention to Protect
Human Rights, 15 McGL. L.J. 205 (1969); Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Responses by
ProfessorsMcDougal andReisman, 3 INT'L LAW. 438 (1969).
46.
Paul Szasz argues that the provision "in cooperation with the organization" can only refer to
actions that the United Nations undertakes itself, not actions that certain Members undertake where the
United Nations is not taking any action. (Private correspondence with author, July 1999). The author is in
agreement, however she would read both "taking action" and "in cooperation" broadly to include acts
undertake by states which are consistent with overall goals of the United Nations.
47.
See Louis B. Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: The ProtectionofRights ofindividualsRather
Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (982).

536

ILSA Journalof International& Comparative Law [Vol. 6:527

of genocide,4" crimes against humanity," and certain war crimes50 subject to
universal jurisdiction and responsibility.5 '
The final argument supporting NATO action in Kosovo rests on the United
Nation's own failure to act. If the United Nations were functioning as it was
intended, unilateral intervention would not be needed. Yet, because the United
Nations system has failed to function properly as a collective body addressing
human rights and other security concerns, states retain the right to act
unilaterally.5 2 Article 43 of the Charter envisioned the creation of a system
48.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
entered into force Jan. 12, 1951. [hereinafter Genocide Convention] The Genocide Convention defines
genocide as:
[A]cts comitted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e)
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id. at Art. II. See also LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLmCAL USE INTHE TWENTIETH CENTURY (198 1).
49.
Crimes against humanity are defined as:
"[Cirimes against Humanity:
namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated..."
"Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT)," in Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of
the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement), August 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, E.A.S.
No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 280. See also Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity:
Resolving the Incoherence, 37 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 787 (1999).
50.
See the Geneva Convention, Articles 1, 3, 13-16 and 23-24 (applying to attacks on and
treatment of both internationals and co-nationals) and Articles 146-147 of the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
51.
Henry T. King, Theodore C. Theofrastous, From Nuremberg to Rome: A Step Backwardfor
U.S. Foreign Policy, 31 CASE W. REs.J. INT'L L. 47, 53-4 (Winter 1999).
52.
W. Michael Reisman, Criteriafor the Lawful Use of Forcein InternationalLaw, 10 YALE J.
INT'L L. 279 (1985). The question as to the extent to which the United Nations Charter affects the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention that existed prior to the adoption of the United Nations Charter is the subject
of a more expanded analysis. For centuries, sovereigns have claimed a right to unilateral humanitarian
intervention in the affairs of another if the subjects were being grossly mistreated. See Fonteyne, The
Customary International Law DoctrineofHumanitarianIntervention: Its Current Validity Under the United
Nations Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 203, 214 (1974). Considerable debate exists as to the extent of
acceptance of the doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention at the time of the drafting of the United
Nations Charter, and the impact of the Charter that doctrine. Cf.Richard IUllich,/Intervention to Protect
Human Rights, 15 MCGI.L L. J.205, 210 (1969) with Wil D. Verwey, HumanitarianIntervention Under
InternationalLaw, 32(3) NErH. L REv. 357 (1985). Professor Lauterpacht conflicted himself as to whether
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has ever become part of customary international law. Cf L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 312 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955) ("There is general agreement that, by
virtue of its personal and territorial supremacy, a State can treat its nationals according to its discretion. But
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whereby states would make available to the Security Council, "on its call and
in accordance with a special agreement or agreement, armed forces, assistance
and facilities ... necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace
and security."5 3 These agreements were to be "negotiated as soon as possible
by the Security Council." 4 To this date, no such agreements have been
negotiated. Article 106 of the Charter envisioned the creation of "transitional
security arrangements" whereby signatories to the Charter could undertake joint
action to maintain peace and security as stop-gap measures until the signing of
Article 43 agreements. The NATO action could be seen as one such stop-gap
measure.55 All of the arguments, taken together, provide an international legal
basis for the decision to use force in Kosovo. The next problem is whether the
means of intervention in Kosovo was appropriate. Did the intervention itself
violate international humanitarian norms?
The most fundamental principle of the law of war is that combatants must
be distinguished from noncombatants and military objectives from protected
property or protected places (i.e. civilian, cultural, and religious property and
places). 6 To this end, the 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 (Protocol ) protects civilians from "indiscriminate
attacks. 5 7 Attacks are considered indiscriminate when they are "not directed
there is a substantial body of opinion and of practice in support of the view that there are limits to that
discretion and that when a State renders itself guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its nationals in
such a way as to deny their fundamental rights and to shock the conscience of mankind, intervention in the
interest of humanity is legally permissible.") with H. Lautherpacht, The Grotian Traditionin International
Law, 23 B Rrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 46 (1946) ("The doctrine of humanitarian intervention has never become a fully
acknowledged part of positive international law.").
53.
U.N. CHARTER, Art. 43, 1.
54.
U.N. CHARTER, Art. 43, 1 3.
55.
The argument for intervention by states due to the failures of the United Nations is not without
precedent. Enforcement actions by the Security Council have almost always been impossible owing to
permanent member veto power. To circumvent this problem during the Korean crisis in 1950, the General
Assembly exercised its own powers reserved under Articles 10-11 and 14 to address "general problems in the
maintenance of peace and security" and to "recommend measures for peaceful adjustment of any situation."
Specifically, the General Assembly adopted the Charter by the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which provides
that:
[1]f the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members,
fails to exercise its primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and
security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter
immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for
collective measures, including in the case of breach of the peace of act of aggression
the use of armed force when necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
GA Res. 377A(V) November 3, 1950.
56.
See Protocol 1,Article 48. See also U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK (2000) 5-5.
57.
Protocol I, Article 51(4).
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against a specific military objective,"58 "employ a method and means of combat
the effects of which cannot be directed at a specific military objective,"59 or
"employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited
as required" by the protocol (e.g., attacks that may cause the "release of
dangerous forces"' or collateral damage "excessive in relation to the concrete
6
and direct military advantage anticipated."). 1
Whether NATO can justify its actions in accordance with these
requirements remains to be seen. Grave concerns are raised by the number of
accidental attacks on non-military targets due to the planes flying at high
altitudes where verification of targets was impossible.62 Clearly, the bombing
was designed in order to avoid any allied casualties. To do so entailed a greater
risk that civilians would be hit. It is not within the spirit of the Geneva
Convention IV and Protocol I to increase disproportionately the risk to civilians
to avoid casualties of your own military.63 Collateral damage to civilians is
permitted. But should all the damage to civilians be considered "collateral"?
Particularly troubling is the choice of targets in the NATO campaign and
the adequacy of its efforts to limit civilian casualties.' United States Secretary
of Defense, William S. Cohen, stated at the outset of the NATO campaign, "We
are attacking the military infrastructure that President Milosevic and his forces
are using to repress and kill people. NATO forces are not attacking the people
' Nonetheless, in the third week of the bombing, NATO forces
of Yugoslavia."65
began to target electrical facilities in Serbia power, depriving much the civilian
population of electricity.' NATO also targeted the factories and other property
belonging to supporters of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, Yugoslav
television and radio stations, bridges, and civilian cars.67 All of these targets
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. I (a).
td.(b).
Protocol I, Article 56.
Protocol 1, Article 51(5)(b).
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For example, on April 12, NATO bombed a civilian passenger train that was crossing a bridge
and on April 14, NATO attacked civilian refugee vehicles in Kosovo. See Michael Dobbs, Karl Vick, Scores
ofRefugees Killed on Road; NA TO Says JetsAimed at Military,WASHINGTON POST FOREIGN SERVICE, April
15, 1999, at AO1.
63.
One could not kill 1,000 Serbian or Albanian civilians in order to save one allied pilot. This
would violate the principle of proportionality. The author is in debt to Paul Szasz for this point.
64.
See generallyHuman Rights Watch, Select Chronology of NATO Attacks, March 24-May 7,
1999 (visited Feb. 6, 2000) <http://www.hrw.orgcampaigns/kosovo98/index.shtml>.
65.
DOD News Briefing, (March 24, 1999) (visited Feb. 6, 2000) <http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Marl999/t03241999_0324sd.html>.
66.
Philip Bennett and Steve Coil, NATO Warplanes Jolt Yugoslav Power Grid, WASHINGTON
POST, May 25, 1999 at Al.
67.
Human Rights Watch identified these incidents in a letter stating its concerns under
international law to United Nations Secretary General Javier Solana. The text of the letter is available on the
Web at (visited Feb. 6, 2000) <http'J/www.hrw.org/hrw/campaigns/kosovo981solana.shtml>.
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may be considered a "dual-use" object, that is, the military as well as civilians
may use them. Under Protocol I, these may be legitimately targeted only if, by
their nature, location, purpose, and use, they make an "effective contribution to
military action" and their capture, neutralization, or destruction, "in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definitive military advantage. 68
Whether all of the targets fulfill these criteria is open to question.6 9
It is unclear whether the targets chosen all made an effective contribution
to Serbia's military action. The media targets, to take one difficult example,
were instrumental in spreading propaganda throughout Serbia and, by making
Serbs feel like victims, the media made it easier for them to justify being
perpetrators.70 However, unlike the case of Rwanda, where the media
disseminated directions for committing the genocide, the media in Serbia did
not disseminate military instructions. The Serb media was not as clearly related
to Serbia's military actions.7
Some targets appear to have been chosen because of their impact on
civilians. Protocol I prohibit targets intended to "spread terror among the
civilian population."7 2 If the main purpose of targeting the media, one of the
most visible pillars of Serb society, was to spread terror among civilians, the
targeting of the media was against international law. Similarly, if the purpose
of targeting the electrical grid was to demoralize and terrorize the civilian
population and not to achieve a concrete military objective, that target was
impermissible. Statements made by allied forces during the air campaign seem
to support the notion that these and other targets were chosen and deemed
effective because of their psychological impact on civilians.
A word on the electrical grid: NATO's attacks on Serbia's electrical grid
was likely to have had a severe impact on civilians in exchange for limited
military utility. NATO knew this. Modem military such as Yugoslavia's have
back-up generators.73 Thus, the attacks on civilian electrical transformers was
likely to have little impact on the country's ability to wage war. The targeting
of the electrical transformers was also suspect under Article 54 of Protocol I,
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Protocol 1,Article 52(2).
See Raju G.C. Thomas, NATO and InternationalLaw, (and in particular part (6)) (visited Feb.
6, 2000) <http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/thomas.litm>.
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(1999).
71.
Hurst Hannum has made this argument. See Chat with International Law Professor Hurst
Hannum, Is NATO Crossing the Line? (ABC News World, May 14, 1999) (visited Feb. 6, 2000)
<http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/chathannum990514.htmbl>.
72.
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which prohibits the destruction of objects that are indispensable to the survival
of the civilian population. Electrical transformers are an indispensable object
for modem societies such as Serbia.
Aside from pointing to specific bombing targets, the overall course of the
NATO bombing and specific actions undertaken should be examined under the
principle of proportionality.7" The concept of proportionality requires an endsoriented assessment. "The anticipated loss of life and damage to property
incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage expected to be gained.""5 Should military planners be able
to realize their goals without loss of civilian life, they should change their
course of action accordingly. Throughout the bombing campaign, the principle
of proportionality required NATO to undertake action designed to elicit some
permissible objective. To the extent that the bombing campaign was viewed as
necessary for ending human rights abuses and returning deported civilians, the
action was within the scope of international law. Unavoidable and unplanned
damage to civilian targets incurred while attacking legitimate military targets
could be termed permissible "collateral damage." Yet, the action became
questionable when it became apparent that the bombing was not effectively
advancing military objectives and the impact of the bombing was one felt
mainly by Serb civilians. NATO refused even to threaten the use of ground
troops, which potentially meant an indefinite continuation of the bombing.
When it became clear that the chosen military means were poorly related to the
desired ends, the means should have been changed, that is, either ground troops
should have been introduced along with the bombing or the bombing should
have been halted and other means employed.
In summary, a close reading of the United Nations Charter supports the
decision to intervene in cases like Kosovo. While the explicit Charter
provisions permitting force do not appear to be applicable to the intervention
in Kosovo, the Charter may be read as implicitly permitting such actions. The
strongest justifications for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo are linked to
affirmative human rights concerns, subject to substantive and procedural
limitations. While the intervention in Kosovo was initially within the limits of
international law, it also appears that the bombing campaign eventually strayed
outside those limits.
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